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i.
he Sickness unto Death distinguishes between two main types of
despair: “not wanting to be oneself” and “wanting to be one­
self”.1 Prior to these two there is another form, which Anti-Climacus 
(and 1 shall here assume thereby also Kierkegaard) describes as 
“being unconscious in despair of having a self (inauthentic despair)” 
(p. 43). The term “inauthentic” might indicate to the reader that there 
is some question whether this third (in effect first) form should really 
count as despair at all in the terms provided by the analysis in The 
Sickness unto Death. That there is a real question here can be seen 
from the fact that, according to that analysis, despair -  defined as a 
sickness of the self -  is an attitude adopted towards the self. Where 
someone is not yet conscious of his or her selfhood in the required 
sense, whatever that sense is, it is difficult to see how such an analy­
sis can be made to apply.
Now Kierkegaard says quite unequivocally that it is the second of 
the two forms of despair properly so-called that is basic; all forms of 
despair can be “resolved into or reduced to this form” (p. 44), i.e. into 
“wanting to be oneself”. I have always assumed Kierkegaard had good 
reason to claim that the second form of despair represents despair in 
general and is therefore the basic form. Naturally, then, I have taken 
the further question of whether there is something to call “inauthentic 
despair” to be a matter of whether there is an unconscious, perhaps 
preconscious, form of despair satisfying this, the second form of 
authentic despair. Michael Theunissen, however, in a recent paper to 
which an earlier version of this essay was a response,2 claims that if 
we reconstruct Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair we find that Kierke­
gaard is mistaken; according to the implications of his own analysis
Kierkegaard should have said that the first form of authentic despair 
is the basic one, the kind he calls not wanting to be oneself. So Theu- 
nissen proposes in his reconstruction as the Grundsatz of Kierke­
gaard’s analysis: “Immediately we want not to be what we are [in our 
selves, our pre-given Dasein, and our human being].”
I try here to vindicate my own reading of Kierkegaard’s text, but with a special eye on considerations to which Professor 
Theunissen’s arguments have alerted me. At one level, what Theunis- 
sens’s proposal, that we see “not wanting/not willing to be ourselves” 
as the basic form of Kierkegaardian despair, has drawn my attention 
to is how pervasive this formula actually is at the textual level. Not 
accepting oneself and wanting to be rid of the self one is are recur­
rent themes in Part One of The Sickness unto Death. There are good 
textual grounds, therefore, for suspecting a tension between Kierke­
gaard’s preferment of the second form of authentic despair and what 
the text actually says. However, an attempt to reconstruct the analysis 
must be based on something deeper than cross-currents on the sur­
face, and at a deeper, structural level Theunissen’s proposal indeed 
raises some very interesting questions, both about what to make of 
the phenomenology behind Kierkegaard’s account and about how to 
treat the text in general. The crux is to be found in what seems to be 
an inevitable implication of Theunissen’s reconstruction, namely that 
the notion of a God-established self enters Kierkegaard’s analysis as 
that form of selfhood in which the pre-given self can envisage its pre­
given situation as acceptable, at least according to Kierkegaard. It is 
the form under which we can in principle finally accept what we are. 
Not wanting to be oneself, then, is not wanting to be the pre-given self 
until this grasp of it is available and appropriated. On my reading, 
however, the self we don’t want to be is the God-established self right 
from the start. A good deal hangs on this, for if the theology can in­
deed be “deferred” as Theunissen in effect proposes, it will be easier 
to place Kierkegaard in the tradition of which many take him to be 
the founder. I shall myself argue that the theological premiss is essen­
tial to Kierkegaard’s analysis and that any reconstruction that takes 
the full measure of his intentions must find room for it from the 
beginning. I open my case by commenting on the form of despair 
called “wanting to be oneself”, the second form of authentic despair. 
The points that are relevant for my differences with Theunissen’s pro­
posed reconstruction will emerge on the way.
2.
As Kierkegaard himself stresses at the very beginning, the kind of . despair he says is basic could not be a form of despair at all 
without the idea of a self established by God. Without it there would 
only be the despair of not wanting to be oneself. And were that in­
deed the only form available, it would be extremely paradoxical to be 
told that you are still in despair even if you want to be yourself. The 
only escape would be total indifference as to whether or not you are 
yourself, which obviously is not what Kierkegaard intends when he 
talks of a state in which “despair is completely eradicated” (p. 44). If 
we understand in a quite straightforward way what it is not to want to 
be ourselves, that is, where we have some idea of the self or person 
we are and we don’t want to be that person -  the kind of case Theu- 
nissen’s Grundsatz refers to -  and we are told that this is a state of 
despair, we would quite naturally assume that the way to avoid 
despair was to want to be this self, to be that self willingly, to go 
along with being it. Unless, that is, we are also told, as we are by Kier­
kegaard, that willingly being oneself still need not be being one’s true 
self. For in that case we can see how we may still be in despair even i f  
we are now wanting to be the self we are. We need, then, some idea of 
a true selfhood to contrast with a selfhood we are willing to take on, 
in order for willing to be the self we take on still to count as a form of 
despair. We need this notion of a “true” self.
But does it have to be that of a God-established self? Might it not just as well be Heidegger’s notion of a self authentically 
related to its death as its “utmost, though indefinite, yet certain pos­
sibility”? The possibility before which, in Heidegger’s functional equi­
valent of Kierkegaardian despair, “Dasein flees in everydayness”.3 Or 
we might go further. Anyone with any notion of an ideal or better self, 
even within everydayness, can allow that presently wanting to be the 
self they previously didn’t want to be may still not be wanting to be 
what they take really to be their true or real self. And if that is all that 
the despair of wanting to be oneself -  of willingly being what one is -  
amounts to, we could envisage escaping despair either by becoming 
a still better self or by adjusting to some everyday specification of 
selfhood we don’t immediately want to be though in some respects 
we allow it is this self we really are. But none of this captures Kierke­
gaardian despair. According to Kierkegaard, it is still possible in
either case to be in despair, because no self at all we become and 
like, and no self we didn’t like but are now satisfyingly adjusted to 
being, is our real, proper, best or “true” self. To be that self, one has 
to make a U-turn and look and move in quite the opposite direction.
That direction is not confronting one’s utmost possibility. For 
according to The Sickness unto Death, thinking that “the end is death 
...death is the end” is precisely to despair (p. 47, emphasis added). 
So not only is it not enough just to have upgraded one’s self accord­
ing to some ideal of everydayness. It is not even enough to emerge 
from one’s refuge in everydayness to face one’s finitude. Indeed, 
embracing death as the end is to be the Kierkegaardian paradigm of 
the properly despairing self.
So Kierkegaard claims there is this notion of selfhood that is a 
notion of a God-established self and asserts that any striving after a 
goal of selfhood that is not an acceptance of this ideal is despair. In a 
way, I suspect, he is really claiming that any striving after a goal of 
selfhood at all is despair -  any striving to become a “better” self than 
the self one is -  because to strive in this self-improving way is to try 
to be a self in a way that is not that of being a God-established self, 
and only the latter gives you the condition in which you can be rid of 
despair. At any rate, I understand Kierkegaard’s main claim to be that 
the fundamental form that despair takes -  that is, the way in which 
despair manifests itself, the behaviour we should call despair in the 
most basic sense -  is that of aiming at, or willingly accepting, specifi­
cations of selfhood that do not have the form of a selfhood estab­
lished by God. As already indicated, the cases where this behaviour 
is most conscious (to the subject or agent in question) is what Kier­
kegaard calls defiance. But Kierkegaard says that there is an element 
of this in all despair (p. 80: “no despair is entirely without defiance”). 
It is both tempting and plausible to suppose that Kierkegaard would 
include here the case of inauthentic despair, where there is as yet no 
conception of being a self about which one can raise questions of 
wanting to be it or not. If Kierkegaard is right in this -  though perhaps 
he isn’t, in which case I think this is where we should first look to find 
out whether he is mistaken -  all “trying to be/being willingly a self” is 
a way of trying to escape or deliberately disregard the form of a God- 
established selfhood. That is, of not wanting to be one’s true, God- 
established self.
T o elaborate, let us take the case Kierkegaard uses introduct­o ry  to illustrate despair at the very beginning of his ac­
count: the “power-crazed” person whose motto is “Caesar or noth­
ing” (p. 49). This means either that if you do not become Caesar you 
will remain nothing or that, since the test of being anything is to 
become Caesar, if you fail that test you have proved you are nothing. 
The slogan “nothing if not Caesar” need not be the monopoly of the 
power-crazed. In some forms it is also the typical goal-description of 
someone with a very weak self-image. But either way, whether you 
are Caesar or not you are still yourself, and what the disjunction 
expresses is some form of flight from this idea: not wanting to be that 
self, not wanting to be that so far unspecified self, to specify which 
one then despairingly thinks it has to become Caesar to be anything. 
Literally, the expression says there is no self, which means that posi­
tively speaking there is nothing yet to say, or worth saying, about this 
self that cannot be said in Caesar terms. However, failure to become 
Caesar does bring to light at least one specification of non-Caesar-like 
selfhood, for now there is at least one evident truth about one’s self, 
and that is that it is a self that cannot become a Caesar. Accordingly, 
as Kierkegaard’s text has it, one wants to be “rid” of this ineffectual 
self (p. 49). But being rid of this self becomes the more evidently 
impossible a task the more conscious one is of being the self in some 
way that is independent of any such specifications, whether negative 
or positive. In the psychological twilight of the gradual dawning of 
that consciousness, there is room for much depth-psychological 
manoeuvring. A fully conscious self can set about trying deliberately 
to improve its possibilities of becoming Caeser by enhancing its basic 
repertoire of abilities; or it can phantasize that it has already ac­
quired and successfully employed that ability. A less than fully self- 
conscious self can easily conceal from itself the fact that it does not 
already have those talents, or conceal the fact that they are indeed 
necessary for achieving the desired end. But however clouded the 
self-consciousness may be, according to Kierkegaard’s text what one 
is really doing is trying to get rid of the idea of being one’s potentially 
true self. So that even if the self were capable of becoming Caesar, 
and actually became Caesar, it would still not have become itself, “[it] 
would have been rid of [itjself” (ibid.). Thus the very project of want­
ing to be Caesar (on pain of being nothing), even before we prove 
incapable of carrying it out, is a way of not wanting to be one’s true 
self. It is a way of trying to be rid of that self, of trying to opt out of
the project of true selfhood. If I may put the point as succinctly as 
possible, Theunissen sees despair as at bottom a matter of not want­
ing to be the human being one is, or not even wanting to be a human 
being at all, where the idea of a God-established selfhood then arises 
as a new perspective from which the project of being human can be 
saved. But Kierkegaard would have us see despair as a matter of not 
wanting to be the God-established self one is. The point may sound 
too fine a one to be interesting, but it isn’t. Let me spell it out once 
more. Kierkegaard is saying that the only undespairing way of willing­
ly being oneself is to grasp oneself as God-established, and according 
to his analysis despair has the fundamental form “wanting to be one­
self”, because accepting any other version of selfhood is a form of 
despair. It is one thing to say that the pre-given Dasein can accept it­
self if, but only if, it adds a divine origin to its own specification and 
then go on to say that despair is not wanting to be the self without 
this added specification; but it is quite another to say that the self 
one does not want to be is the self with its divine origin already estab­
lished, and that despair is turning one’s back on that self-conception.
But if the claim that there are three forms of despair, and not just two, is to be taken seriously, Kierkegaard must be able 
to convince us that even where there is as yet no idea of such a true 
self, some form of motivation expressible in “Caesar or nothing” 
terms is at work, a motivation which already expresses a direction 
away from the notion of true selfhood. That sounds implausible per­
haps. But not impossible. It might be shown that the very presump­
tion that the only kind of selfhood desirable or available is Caesar- 
track selfhood embodies a deeply embedded resistance to the notion 
of a quite different kind of selfhood. If so, we could see even in “inau­
thentic” despair some hint of the form of despair Kierkegaard calls 
defiance -  the second form of authentic despair -  wanting to be one­
self, or more perspicuously, wanting to be one's self. Such an under­
lying reluctance to pursue the path of true selfhood, manifested in 
the Caesar-or-nothing attitude, might then deserve to be called 
despair, even if it is only an inauthentic form. For, although a pre-con­
dition of defiance proper is missing, namely the conscious sense of a 
true selfhood established by God which, in true despair, one shuns or 
denies (p. 98; cf. p. 80), there is still something there answering to the 
structure of defiance. There is a movement away from that form of 
selfhood, whether a flight or resistance. Some of the sense of this
might be put by saying that what even the /^authentically despairing 
person wants rid of is the ideal of a self for which Caesar-projects 
(making a name for yourself, making one’s mark) are precisely that -  
renderings unto Caesar of what should be rendered unto God, or sur- 
renderings even, since there is the hint of some psychological strate­
gy at work. So one might be able to say that wanting to be rid of a 
weak self that can’t be Caesar is “really” wanting to be rid of the self 
that shouldn’t be attempting anything in the way of Caesar-projects 
in any case.
Whatever sense or plausibility this claim may have, it is interest­
ing to note how Kierkegaard can exploit the ambiguity in the expres­
sion “not wanting to oneself”. In one sense it means simply that it is 
false that one wants to be oneself, while in another it means that 
among the things a person wants consciously not to be, is to be him- 
or herself. As it stands, on the first interpretation, the description can 
be true of someone who has never even conceived of a state of self­
hood that he or she either is currently in or might possibly be in. Of 
course, not wanting to be oneself in this sense is compatible with 
total indifference as to whether one is or is not oneself, and you 
might think this kind of case should be excluded from an “existential 
dialectic” which should, after all, be concerning itself with the kinds 
of energy that keep things in motion. However, from what we have 
said it isn’t clear that in the context of The Sickness unto Death the 
primary notion must be one of actively wanting not to be oneself. 
What Kierkegaard is providing is a depth analysis of forms of flight 
and, as we have observed, these need not take the form of open 
defiance of a clearly appropriated notion of selfhood. Behavioural 
patterns of various kinds, typically of the form “trying to be a self of a 
certain kind”, can be depth-read in terms appropriate to defiance but 
without actually amounting to defiance; that is, they can be depth- 
read in terms of unwillingness, reluctance, evasion, etc., where what 
is resisted is not at all clearly faced and may not yet even be formu­
lated or even suspected. That does, of course, make the notion of 
“indifference” a trifle suspect, for the behaviour will be read in strate­
gic terms even where there is no conscious strategy, and the indiffe­
rence will be thought of as being rather of the “studied” kind. But this 
may still be a reasonable way of interpreting Kierkegaard. The second 
of the two forms of authentic despair, the kind called “wanting to be 
oneself”, is basic because all despair, even in its preconscious vari­
eties, has the form of a flight from, or resistance to, that notion of
selfhood which alone can make you want to be a human being. Recall 
once more that on Theunissen’s account the first form of authentic 
despair, “not wanting to be oneself”, is basic because all despair has 
the form of a flight from our given selfhood. The only way of remov­
ing the motivation for that flight being, or so I read him as reconstruc- 
tively reading Kierkegaard, to see the pre-given self in the light of an 
appended theological “premiss”.
We may note that indirect support for the notion of an actively 
inspired indifference may be found in those parts of Kierkegaard’s 
analysis of despair where indifference is clearly intended to be por­
trayed both as despair and as a symptom of at least previous hidden 
activity. We find this in the case of the kind of despair referred to as 
“spiritlessness”, or a “spiritless sense of security” (p. 100; cf. p. 74). In 
the “dialectical” account offered, the deep structure of spiritlessness 
betrays a form of activity and interest. It is a form of self-satisfaction, 
a way of life selected because it prevents the choice of either becom­
ing or not becoming oneself from ever coming into view. It is the 
apparently secure, though Kierkegaard thinks also brittle and so in 
the last resort vulnerable, way of life of the petit bourgeois. In short, 
although the idea of getting rid of oneself is in the first instance that 
of getting rid of one’s actual self, the deeper sense of wanting rid of 
oneself is still that of not wanting the selfhood that would make you 
content with your humanity.
What, however, can we say positively about this true self­hood? In Kierkegaard’s analysis there is a crucial transi­
tion from the first kind of authentic despair to the second. It involves 
becoming conscious of being a self in a special way, not yet the true 
self but a necessary prolegomenon to becoming that. One first 
becomes conscious of being something or other, though of course 
not some thing -  let us call it a self -  distinct both from others and 
from the environing world (pp. 85, 86). Once one is conscious of one­
self as distinct from any other and from the world, it is impossible to 
want to be numerically another (see p. 86). The project of getting rid 
of oneself by becoming another is therefore no longer possible, and 
indeed is seen to have been impossible all along. Kierkegaard seems 
to say something else is impossible too: since death is a finite event, 
we can no longer conceive of it as our (my, your) end (p. 49). Despair 
now has the canonical form of the sickness unto death, in the special 
sense specified by the author: being unable to die (p. 48). It is from
here on that despair takes the form of wanting to be oneself, but as 
one’s own self. What does that mean? I suggest we look for an answer 
in the notion of weakness. As noted, in Kierkegaard’s analysis of 
despair there is no consciousness (or “conception” [p. 13]) of self 
until the transition just mentioned occurs. It is consciousness of a 
self that makes the application of the formula for basic Kierkegaard- 
ian despair possible. For there to be such a conception a person 
must be conscious of something “eternal” in the self, a specification 
which first occurs in an abstract way when one despairs of the earth­
ly -  of Caesar-projects -  and yet realizes that it is not really the earth­
ly or something earthly that one despairs over. One realizes that what 
led one into not wanting to be oneself, far from being the failure to 
become Caesar, was already motivating the attempt to become Cae­
sar. Becoming Caesar, even a little one, was part of the (impossible) 
project of being rid of the eternal.
The transition to the second (for Kierkegaard fundamental) form 
of despair then goes something like this -  and this is the only place I 
claim to be deliberately doing anything that might deserve being 
called “reconstructing” Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair. Where, in 
the earlier form, despair takes the form of wanting to be rid of a self 
that is too weak to become whatever it sets its sights on becoming, at 
the transitional stage it takes the form of wanting to be rid of a self 
not because it proves incapable of becoming that, but because it is 
only capable of placing its hopes in projects of a worldly nature. The 
object of despair is now not one’s self qua incapable of becoming Cae­
sar, but oneself as a self caught up in the pursuit of earthly goals and 
unable to grasp hold of the eternal. What consciousness is now con­
scious of (to speak in an elliptically Hegelian manner) is its own 
weakness in this respect, the actual self’s weakness, its being too 
weak to turn for support to the eternal. One resort is the way of 
accommodation, going along with the new found weakness but turn­
ing it to advantage by making it look like a strength. A passive fear of 
turning to the eternal itself for support becomes an active spurning 
of any help from that quarter (pp. 124-5; cf. p. 101); and then it 
becomes a holding fast to some suffering of which the eternal could 
relieve one, if only one were willing to see the suffering as just a con­
tingent feature of oneself and not, as now, the misery which gives you 
your life-time’s role as a piece of living “evidence against all exis­
tence” (p. 105). By treating it as an essential feature one manufactu­
res an excuse not to have to call on the eternal, such help being
“humiliation” (p. 102). Here we have the dynamics of the making of 
one’s own self, the despair Kierkegaard calls defiance.
The other resort is to accept one’s weakness, in the same way 
that in the former case one accepts one’s suffering, that is as an 
essential feature of being human. Accepting that one is too weak to 
face the eternal on one’s own, one “humbles oneself before God 
under [one’s] weakness” (p. 92; cf. p. 93), and that is Kierkegaard’s 
proposed way -  what he or Anti-Climacus would say is the Christian 
way -  out of despair. It is to humble oneself in a way that in despair, 
but only then, would count as humiliation. Where the defiant, self- 
positing despairer specifies what Kierkegaard calls the infinite form 
of the self in Caesar-like terms, the non-despairer gives this infinite 
self the form of the eternal by fully giving himself up to the idea that 
such projects are inimical to true selfhood.
In short, then, instead of seeing that weakness is a positive char­
acteristic of the self in respect of the eternal in consciousness, or 
instead of seeing that the notion of selfhood conceived in Caesar-like 
terms must be “deconstructed” in order to take advantage of the 
form of the infinite self to find consolation and health, the person 
grabs hold of the opportunity provided by the idea of an infinite form 
of the self, still abstract (p. 99) and “negative” (p. 122: “the most 
abstract possibility of the self”; p. 124, “the negative self, the infinite 
form of the self”), to “posit” its own selfhood in ways that compen­
sate for this weakness, or in other ways obscure it. Despair now takes 
the (inherently unstable) form of creating the person’s own version of 
selfhood within the new-found or newly constituted category of the 
infinite self.
3 .
So far I have tried to show how Kierkegaard’s theological premiss gives him a special reason for wanting to count as basic this lat­
ter form of despair, which he calls “wanting to be oneself”. It is basic 
if despair as defiance does indeed cast light on what deep, dark, and 
dim motivations are at work in cases of despair where there is as yet 
no clearly sensed notion of being an “infinite” self, of “being distinct” 
in the senses mentioned above. It is basic if not wanting to be oneself 
is more revealingly construed in terms of the true rather than the pre­
given self, reluctance to be the latter being understood then as a sur­
face symptom of the more pervasive reluctance to be the former.
But there is a rejoinder to this. Surely, if the formula “not want­
ing to be oneself” is understood in the sense 1 have adopted of not 
wanting to be one’s true self, there is no reason why this rather than 
“wanting to be oneself” should not still be the formula expressing 
what is basic in Kierkegaardian despair. So Theunissen’s proposal 
about the Grundsatz can hold except that we replace the “pre-given” 
with the “God-established” self as the self we do not want to be, even 
immediately. That is correct so far as it goes. But there is another 
consideration to introduce, a reason why Kierkegaard should still 
want to regard “wanting to be oneself” as the basic form. To see what 
this consideration is let me cite and comment on an argument of 
Theunissen’s for calling the first form of (authentic) despair basic; 
that is, for taking the Grundsatz in Kierkegaard’s analysis to be that 
we don’t immediately want to be what we pre-givenly are.
Theunissen notes a mutual motivational dependence between 
the two main forms of despair. The fact that we want to be other 
selves than we are is due to our not wanting to be the selves we are, 
and the fact that we do not want to be the selves we are is due to our 
wanting to be selves we are not. But, points out Theunissen, while 
the former is always true, the latter is only sometimes true. Thus, on 
his own reading of the formulas, identifying the self we don’t want to 
be as the pre-given self, I can very well want not to be myself even 
without having some alternative in mind. So not wanting to be the 
selves we are is always the reason behind Kierkegaardian despair, 
while wanting to be the selves we are is only sometimes the reason.
ertainly it is true that whenever we want to be another it is
because we don’t want to be what we are, while it is false
that, whenever we don’t want to be the selves we are, the reason is 
that we want to be another. We can think of cases where we are dis­
satisfied with our selves in specific ways in which we can be better 
by improving ourselves and not by becoming another. And we can, on 
Kierkegaard’s analysis, be dissatisfied with ourselves and at the same 
time refuse to accept that any way of becoming another, or even of an 
upgraded version of what we are, will remove the dissatisfaction. But 
if, as I propose, we read the “self” which we don’t want to be as the 
“ideal self”, or “true self”, it is surely never because we want to be 
selves we are not that we want not to be these selves. That is, it is
never the case that the reason for my not wanting to be my true self 
is that I want to be another. One does not say, I do not want to be my 
true self because I want to be Caesar; one says (if the situation of 
one’s saying so is conceivable) I want to become Caesar because in 
that way I avoid becoming my true self. Perhaps I might say, if asked 
by someone why I don’t want to be myself, that it’s because I want to 
be Caesar, since where these are the options my answer accurately 
states my preference. Still, this answer does not give a reason for the 
preference. If asked why I choose to become Caesar, the reason might 
be -  though it may not be one that I myself am either in a position or, 
if I was in that position, would care to give -  that I don’t want to be 
my true self. But then the case clearly belongs at least to the letter of 
Theunissen’s first category: wanting to be what we are not because 
not wanting to be what we are. According to Theunissen this should 
indicate, even more strongly than his own argument does, that “not 
wanting to be oneself” is the basic form. That it nonetheless doesn’t 
belong to the spirit of Theunissen’s first category is because his argu­
ment depends on the self we don’t want to be being our pre-given 
Dasein and not our God-established self.
1 would argue, then, that far from the fact that not every in­
stance of not wanting to be ourselves is due to our wanting to be 
someone we are not, showing that not wanting to be oneself is basic 
(because not wanting to be oneself is always the reason for wanting 
to what we are not), to identify what is basic to Kierkegaardian 
despair we should look for the procedures people adopt when they 
do not want to be their true selves. Even if my wanting to be another 
is not always a reason for not wanting to be myself, it is nevertheless 
always the way I try not to be myself. And the procedure is best cap­
tured in the formula “wanting to be selves they are not”, that is, the 
form most transparently manifested in defiance, in being defiantly 
one’s own self, though it is also manifested in any form of persona 
adopted as an escape from the rigours of infinite selfhood and the 
need to choose for or against the eternal. Kierkegaard wants to say, 
as I have argued above, that a ll despair partakes of the structure of 
defiance. He would say that this form -  wanting to be a self we are 
not -  is basic because it captures the basic structure of the self fated 
to face the prospect of its true selfhood. Wanting to be oneself is the 
basic form of despair both because defiance -  wanting to be one’s 
own self -  can be retro-analytically read into less conscious forms of 
despair as a defence strategy, and because taking on roles, whether
to disguise a lack of true selfhood or as a vehicle for an untrue alter­
native, is the typical form of refuge people take from the rigours of 
selfhood.
4 .
Suppose we grant, then, that the fact that the despair of wanting to be oneself has the form of defiance gives it a special status, repre­
senting as it does the refusal to face up to the rigours of God-estab­
lished selfhood. There is still a further argument that can be levelled 
against Kierkegaard’s analysis, an argument which may still seem to 
support Theunissen’s deferral of the theology. It can be argued that, if 
the observations Kierkegaard refers to as phenomenological evi­
dence or confirmation of his analysis can be used equally and with­
out remainder to support an analysis that takes pre-given Dasein to 
be the self we do not want to be, then the theology is a gratuitous 
addition also on Kierkegaard’s part. So even though Kierkegaard 
begins with it, the analysing reader can afford to ignore it and bring it 
in at the end, perhaps explaining it away in terms of Kierkegaard’s 
cultural time and place, or as introduced by Kierkegaard for any num­
ber of possible but extraneous reasons including polemical ones.
We might therefore think of two levels or “stages” of difficulty in 
connection with selfhood. The first can be described in terms of the 
now classical existentialist notion of “existence”, as a structure pecu­
liar to being human, the being able, but also in a way compelled, to 
frame answers to questions of what we are. What am I to make of 
myself in particular, and what am I to make of being human in gener­
al? Or, perhaps closer to the mainstream existentialist idea, the posi­
tion in which we are compelled to frame answers to the latter ques­
tion by taking upon ourselves responsibility for the de facto answers 
our own activities, our manifest selves, give to the former question. 
Here it is the opening up of the sphere of personal freedom and 
responsibility that is so forbidding, as well, it is important to add, as 
the corresponding process of de-identification that occurs as the 
individual progressively “deconstructs” its own inherited pictures of 
its nature and forms of belongingness and is left to put the pieces 
together as he will and on his own. One takes comfort in accepted 
roles and manners, one becomes Heidegger’s das Man. The earlier,
pre-defiance forms of despair can then be reconstructed as defence- 
mechanisms in the face of this prospect of total deconstruction. That 
they can be so reconstructed, without strain, is I think a plausible 
view.
he second level adds a notion of spiritual completeness,
answering to what Hegel calls the satisfaction of spirit, of
the need that motivates philosophy, the need, as Hegel says, for the 
mind “to gratify its highest and most inward life”.4 In Kierkegaard the 
satisfaction is not intellectual; it is a satisfaction of the existential 
needs of the practical subject or agent, something it might be fruitful 
to see in the Kantian terms of a quest for “happiness” through virtue. 
In any case, the continuity with the philosophical tradition can be 
emphasized here by saying that the scope of the activity defined by 
the “void” that opens up before the increasingly self-conscious indi­
vidual is defined in terms appropriate to the notion of a summum 
bonum, a state of “blessedness” in which one is deservedly integrated 
into the scheme of things through one’s good actions. Otherwise one 
is left out, a misfit, or even a dead loss, a worthless being. The stre­
nuousness of the project of avoiding being a misfit and worthless is 
the requirement that the given self be deconstructed in order “to get 
to the self” (see p. 120; cf. p. 96) or “win itself”. Along with the self as 
it initially grasps itself, the standards of goodness which it assumes 
qualify it for integration and blessedness must also be broken down 
and revised. One prefers the familiar picture.
Now it might be claimed that it is only once the existential situa­
tion feared in the earlier forms of despair is too clearly recognized to 
be ignored that the second level comes into view. It comes into view, 
and play, as offering the option of a solution to the problem of the 
isolated individual, or what Kierkegaard calls the “infinite, negative 
self” (pp. 101, etc.). This is what the argument we are considering 
proposes. The account allows us to lift off the whole theological 
dimension in Kierkegaard’s account while still leaving the essentials 
of the analysis of despair intact. The idea of a God-established self 
can be left to the end as an option facing the despairer. The cost of 
this interpretation is that we must revise Kierkegaard’s own claim 
about what form of despair is basic. Theunissen is willing to bear that 
cost. And indeed perhaps it is not an unbearable cost, especially if 
the descriptions Kierkegaard gives of preconscious despair, and of 
despair in (rather than over) weakness, can be accepted without hav-
ing to bring in the second-level scenario at all; for then they can be 
seen simply as descriptions of defences against having to see oneself 
as an infinite, negative self.
There are, however, two obvious objections. One is that we lose 
the whole point of Kierkegaard’s analysis. We should recall the cir­
cumstances of Kierkegaard’s writing The Sickness unto Death. As a 
late work, stemming from the time when the either/or was widening 
so far as to leave no middle position between aestheticism on the one 
hand and pure faith on the other, it is the work of an author for whom 
all institutionalized ethics and institutionalized religion were anath­
ema. The roles people took on, as wife, husband, functionary, or 
whatever, particularly the roles of bishop, priest or parson, were spi­
ritually empty. Kierkegaard’s polemical concern was to reveal this 
feature of society and to diagnose it in the terms he had chosen. 
These were Christian terms directed against Christendom, that is, 
against the form that Christianity (no longer the properly Christian 
life) had taken in his native Denmark, the more self-consciously so in 
the political and cultural aftermath of 1848, the year in which the 
work was written. Kierkegaard captured the fundamental cultural 
malaise of his time in the notion of the finitizing of the infinite. Institu­
tionalizing the spirit is one main way of doing this, the most prevalent 
in Kierkegaard’s society perhaps. And the institutionalizing of spirit is 
precisely the adoption of forms, of external forms, of ways of life, 
ways of being oneself in which one wants to be that self. Being such a 
self willingly was the main public target of Kierkegaard’s analysis of 
despair. Of course, not all despairs exploit existing institutional roles. 
There are Caesars too, who look for glory and conquest, and liber­
tines and seducers who fail to place themselves within any ethical 
reality at all, along with religious fanatics. In his typology of despair 
Kierkegaard tries to find a place for all of these. The key is the idea of 
a loss of, and a reluctance to go forward to, what he calls the “eter­
nal” in one’s consciousness, as an “unconditional” basis for the estab­
lishment of a genuinely interpersonal life. It is this reluctance and all 
its forms that Kierkegaard attempts to press into the “synthesis” 
framework of The Sickness unto Death. What is striking about Kierke­
gaard’s typology is how many of the despairs which fall under the 
headings provided are able to masquerade as the real thing, whether 
in hollow rendering to God in the form of institutionalized religion or 
in noisy renderings to Caesar which can easily be taken to be exam­
ples of humanity at its greatest, “externalities” behind which no one
would dream of looking for the despair which, in its “spiritual” forms, 
has no typical behavioural counterpart or expression (p. 104). Or for 
that matter in forms of religious fanaticism that take no account of 
the ethical workplace, the area of close contact in which alone good­
ness can be manifested; and also in “locked-up” ways of living in 
which the eternal in oneself is not allowed to find expression. Pro­
vided with suitable external forms, human beings can deceive not 
only others but themselves, and deceive themselves the more effec­
tively by deceiving those others upon whose recognition their own 
identities depend. They can deceive themselves not only about how 
well they qualify for happiness but also about what really counts for 
happiness. Where these channels and disguises are lacking one may 
perhaps expect to find conspicuous madness. But there is a continu­
ity all the same. Kierkegaardian despair is a general phenomenon, 
and it includes Heidegger. It is the failure to let the inward develop­
ment take place that leads to the consciousness of the “eternal” in 
the self which would disclose the true nature of these roles, and 
allow them to be replaced or at least renewed or re-evaluated. This, I 
think, expresses the intention we may well attribute to Kierkegaard, 
who said of The Sickness unto Death, that here he had been able to 
“illuminate” Christianity “on a greater scale” than “he had ever dared 
to hope”, so that “crucial categories are brought plainly to light”.5 
Presumably he means the categories of self, sin, despair, and stand­
ing before God. Kierkegaard tries to convince us that any form of 
behaviour that falls short of standing humbly before the source of all 
selfhood is an attempt not to do that. This I think is the picture that 
captures best the dialectic of Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair.
The second objection to deferring the theology is that doing so 
begs the question of whether the first of our two scenarios does bet­
ter justice to the measure of human aspiration, and therefore corre­
spondingly of despair, than the second. Here one must bear in mind 
Kierkegaard’s stress on the unconditionality of the basis for the 
establishment of a genuinely interpersonal life, and the fact that in 
his account Heideggerian authenticity is still a state of despair. These 
are questions far beyond the scope of this essay, so I will end instead 
on a matter of detail. As far as reconstructing Kierkegaard’s own 
thought is concerned, the fact that Theunissen’s version of the anal­
ysis of despair represents Kierkegaard as making several serious 
errors in his thinking does at least predispose us to any alternative 
version in which the errors disappear. And in at least two cases they
do just that if we revert to the reading which takes Kierkegaard at his 
word.
First, on Theunissen’s reading there appears to be a kind of conceptual hiatus in the transition from not wanting to be an 
unspecified (“abstract or negative”) self to not wanting to appropri­
ate the specified (“concrete”) self. Theunissen charges Kierkegaard 
with failure to do justice to both a temporal and a motivational dis­
tinction. The project of wanting to be rid of the self only arises once 
the appropriate stage of self-consciousness has been reached, and it 
is motivated by a sense of confinement (to the specifications of the 
pre-given self), while the earlier unwillingness to be the abstract self 
is motivated by an anxiety at the prospect of having no specification. 
The hiatus disappears, however, once we allow the abstract self to be 
the preliminary form of the true self, and let the concrete self provide 
the specifications the abstract self must give itself in order to be the 
true self. In this respect it is interesting that on Theunissen’s reading 
the only difference between wanting to be oneself in despair and 
wanting to be one’s true self is that in the former case one is only 
able to accept an edited version of the pre-given self. But that leaves 
us with no adequate explanation of why someone should not be quite 
happy with the self they are, as pre-given and unedited. It also leaves 
it something of a mystery why the notion of a God-established self 
should make all the difference. Again, if it is the true self and not the 
pre-given self that we fail to appropriate, accepting the pre-given self 
in its unedited version is still a case of willing in despair to be what 
one is as against being what one is truly.
Second, Theunissen sees Kierkegaard as providing an ineffectual 
argument for the distinctiveness (and basicness) of the second form 
of authentic despair. He attributes to Kierkegaard the claim that only 
in the despair of wanting to be what we are can we be said to be will­
ing something we know to be impossible. The crux here is Kierke­
gaard’s claim that we cannot be rid of our true selves -  this is the real 
core of the notion of a sickness unto death -  or that at least we can­
not be rid of the preliminary form of the true self. The point is rough­
ly that, however much we try to create forms of selfhood that 
obscure the true self, it is only as what we implicitly know to be the 
true self that we are engaged in that activity. The impossibility here is 
something like a mirror-image of that of Descartes’s doubter doubting 
that he doubts; you cannot help being what you try not to be when
what you are trying to be has to be doing the trying; except that in 
our case the despairer is trying despairingly to vacate a position 
which, in Descartes’s case, the doubter is desperately trying to in­
habit. It is true that on Theunissen’s reading, where the self is the 
pre-given self, the “tactical” self, the impossibility will not be specific 
to the second form of despair, for trying to be rid of what you tactical­
ly are is also impossible. So the argument fails. But if the self we can­
not be rid of is (at least) the preliminary form of the true self -  the 
infinite but negative self -  then not only is the argument not Kierke­
gaard’s, it will indeed be the case that defying possibility is exclusive­
ly characteristic of the despair of wanting to be oneself. The defiance 
in question cannot arise until the self has been constituted (or “posit­
ed”) in that form, for only then can it become the topic of the con­
scious intention not to be it. Theunissen says that to give the notion 
of defiance some purchase in the case of the “weak” despair of not 
wanting to be oneself, Kierkegaard has to give some kind of a con­
structivist interpretation to wanting to be oneself. Only then can it be 
said that a defiant wanting to be what one is can already be discerned 
in that form of despair -  so that one can be defiantly wanting to be 
one’s own version of the pre-given self. But once again, if the “one­
self” that one does not want to be is the true self, then there is alrea­
dy a touch of defiance in staying with the pre-given self, and no con­
structivism is needed. The pre-given self is being used “defiantly” as a 
protection, either by whatever there is of a true self lurking undevel­
oped behind the closed door of which Kierkegaard speaks, or by 
something less than the true self when, because nothing can develop 
unless the door is opened, there is just a “kind of false door, in the 
background of [the] soul, with nothing behind it” (p. 86).
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